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Abstract
In this paper, I discuss the use of after-effects as a criterion for showing that we can 
perceive high-level properties. According to this criterion, if a high-level property 
(for example, an emotional expression) is susceptible to after-effects, this suggests 
that the property can be perceived, rather than cognized. The defenders of the cri-
terion claim that, since after-effects are also present for low-level, uncontroversially 
perceptual properties (such as orientation), we can safely infer that high-level after-
effects are perceptual as well. The critics of the criterion, on the other hand, assimi-
late it to superficially similar effects in cognition (such as decision biases) and argue 
that the after-effect criterion is a cognitive phenomenon rather than a perceptual one, 
and that as a result it is not a reliable guide for exploring the contents of perception. 
I argue against both of these views and show that high-level after-effects cannot be 
identified either with low-level after-effects or with cognitive biases. I suggest an 
intermediate position: high-level after-effects are not cognitive, but they are none-
theless not a good criterion for exploring the contents of perception.
Keywords Perceptual content · After-effects · Perception · Cognition · Border 
between perception and cognition
1 Introduction
What can we perceive, rather than cognize?1 Which properties enter into the con-
tents of our visual perceptual experiences? Some properties are uncontroversially 
seen: edges, shapes, orientations, and colors are all examples of properties that can 
enter into the contents of our visual states (Prinz 2006). On the other hand, there are 
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other properties that are surely not seen (unless “see” is used metaphorically), but 
instead cognized, such as “being a tapestry woven in the 15th century” or “being a 
trade deal”.
Nevertheless, there are properties that are not obviously perceptual, but that could 
potentially be seen, rather than cognized. The most telling example of such proper-
ties are emotional expressions. Emotions are complex mental states. They involve 
an object or a state of affairs as their target and are holistically interconnected with 
many other mental states. For example, my happiness at seeing my partner after a 
long time apart has his arrival as its object and is connected to other mental states, 
such as the belief that he will land at the airport tomorrow, the intention to take the 
bus to meet him there, and so on. It is implausible that all facets of my happiness 
can be seen. Emotional expressions, on the other hand, are potential candidates for 
being seen: a stranger glancing at me on the bus sees my smile and immediately has 
a visual experience of me as being happy, without cognitive effort on her part. While 
she can’t access via perception the object of my happiness, nor the other mental 
states my happiness is connected to, she can visually perceive my facial expression 
of happiness.
My aim in this paper is not to exhaustively discuss the debate about the reach of 
the contents of perception (Hawley and Macpherson 2011), nor to show that some 
non-obviously perceptual properties can literally be seen,2 but it is rather to critically 
discuss the import of experimental evidence in the debate about the reach of percep-
tual content,3 with a focus on one particular kind of evidence regarding the role of 
after-effects (Fish 2013; Block 2014).
The basic idea behind arguments that appeal to after-effects is that if a property is 
susceptible to after-effects, this suggests that it can be perceived.4 After-effects have 
been discovered not only for uncontroversially perceptual properties, such as orien-
tation, but also for properties that are not prima facie perceptual, such as emotional 
expressions. Thus, if such arguments are sound, they support extending the reach of 
perceptual content to include such high-level properties. The appeal to after-effects, 
however, raises (at least) three questions:
1. Are after-effects for uncontroversially perceptual properties and after-effects for 
controversially perceptual properties instances of the same phenomenon?
2. Are after-effects for controversially perceptual properties perceptual or post-
perceptual (cognitive) phenomena?
2 I have done this elsewhere for emotional expressions (Smortchkova 2017).
3 There is other experimental evidence that could be used in the debate, for example evidence from vis-
ual agnosiae (Bayne 2009). There is also a method that does not appeal to experimental evidence but to 
carefully built contrast cases in conjunction with an inference to the best explanation (Siegel 2010). I will 
not discuss these methods here.
4 In the rest of the paper I will write interchangeably that a property can be “experienced” or “repre-
sented” in perception. I don’t want to enter into vexed debates about the relation between the representa-
tional part and the experiential part of perceptual states. A reader who is against the idea that perception 
is representational can replace all occurrences of representation with experience.
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3. Are there after-effects with high-level properties that do not involve the represen-
tation of the high-level property?
Each of these questions constitutes a challenge to the after-effect criterion. In this 
paper I examine each challenge in turn. First, I argue that the assumption in the 
after-effect argument that low-level after-effects and high-level after-effects are man-
ifestations of the same phenomenon is not justified (Sect.  4). Second, I critically 
discuss the cognitive interpretation of after-effects and its limitations in assimilating 
known after-effects with similar phenomena in cognition (Sect.  5). Third, I show 
that even if the cognitive interpretation is not successful, this is not enough to save 
the after-effect criterion, because there is still a third alternative, which is intermedi-
ate between the one proposed by the defenders of the criterion and the one proposed 
by the critics of the criterion (Sect. 6).
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. In Sect. 2 I present an overview 
of after-effects. In Sect. 3 I discuss how they have been appealed to in the debate 
about the reach of perceptual content. In Sect. 4 I criticize this use of after-effects by 
raising a worry about the assumption that low-level and high-level after-effects are 
instances of the same phenomenon. In Sect. 5 I consider an alternative view of after-
effects as spanning both perception and cognition and show the limits of such an 
approach. In Sect. 6 I discuss the possibility that high-level after-effects could occur 
without the representation of the high-level property.
2  A brief overview of after‑effects
Our cognitive systems are highly adaptable to variations in the environment. The 
term “adaptation” covers all the ways in which an organism adjusts to a change in 
circumstances. For example, we can adapt to working on a night shift, by adjust-
ing our sleeping patterns. Perceptual adaptation, in particular, refers to the ways in 
which perception changes in response to variations in stimulation: for example, in 
vision we can adapt to the change of lightening at dusk, or in olfaction we can adapt 
to the perfume we are wearing so we don’t smell it on us anymore. Classic experi-
ments on adaptation were done by the Gestalt psychologist Ivo Kohler, who gave his 
subjects goggles that inverted the left and right sides of the visual field, or the top 
and bottom of the visual field, or that distorted colors. In all of these cases, subjects 
adapted to the change in experience after some time. The focus of this paper is on a 
specific kind of perceptual adaptation: perceptual after-effects.5
Perceptual after-effects are a phenomenon known at least since Aristotle, who 
described the motion after-effect, a visual illusion that occurs after viewing a mov-
ing visual stimulus for a certain amount of time and then switching to a stationary 
stimulus that then appears to move in the opposite direction to the original moving 
5 Sometimes perceptual adaptation and perceptual after-effects are used interchangeably, but I will only 
use after-effects in the rest of the paper to avoid confusion.
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stimulus (Ross 1955). We find a classic description of an after-effect in the follow-
ing passage from Gibson and Radner:
The subject observes a grating with lines tilted toward the left for x seconds, 
after this period, which is the period of adaptation, the subject observes a grat-
ing with vertical lines. The subject’s experience is of a grating with the lines 
tilted toward the right (even if, objectively, the lines are vertical). In adapta-
tion, the subjective experience pushes the adapted property in the opposite 
direction from the adaptive property (Gibson and Radner 1937, p. 558).
Below is an illustration of the effect for the property ‘tilt’ (Fig. 1).
Properties that show the effect are those that are usually associated with the con-
tents of vision: lines (straight and curved), colors, speed of motion, direction of 
motion, orientation, spatial frequency, among others (Thompson and Burr 2009). 
Initially, the effect was explained by the neurons’ “fatigue model”, according to 
which there are neurons specifically attuned to, e.g., different orientations or direc-
tions of motion, that “saturate” after being exposed to a stimulus. This model was 
supported by the discovery in the visual cortex of cats and monkeys of cells attuned 
to orientation and direction (Vautin and Berkley 1977), and whose psychophysical 
profile corresponded to the time-course of adaptation. This model, however, was 
called into question by the discovery of effects that could not be explained via an 
appeal to “fatigue” of single neurons, because they could last for days instead of 
minutes, and by the discovery of effects not underpinned by only one population of 
neurons (Thompson and Burr 2009).
The cases just mentioned involve properties that everyone usually agrees are 
perceived. But similar after-effects occur even for properties that are not obvi-
ously perceptual. I will call the first kind of properties “low-level properties” and 
the latter “high-level properties”. High-level properties that have been claimed to be 
susceptible to after-effects so far include the following properties of faces: gender 
(Little et  al. 2005; Zhao et  al. 2011), age (Webster et  al. 2004), ethnicity (Jaquet 
et al. 2008), emotional expressions (Pollak et al. 2009), face identity (Rhodes and 
Leopold 2011), gaze direction (Schweinberger et al. 2007), attractiveness (Anzures 
et al. 2009; Rhodes et al. 2003), cuteness (Golle et al. 2013). Some of these proper-
ties also apply to the perception of human bodies, e.g. gender (Troje et al. 2006) or 
attractiveness (Winkler and Rhodes 2005).
Fig. 1  Illustration for tilt
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As an illustration I present an experiment done by Schweinberger et  al. (2010) 
to test adaptation to age expressed in the face (young or old). Subjects adapt to an 
induction stimulus consisting of a series of faces in a certain age range (young or 
old). Then they are presented with a morphed face between age groups and are 
asked to guess the age of the person. The test stimulus appears6 as being older if the 
induction stimulus consisted of young faces, and as being younger if the induction 
stimulus consisted of old faces.
While all these experiments involve the visual modality, effects for high-level 
properties also exist for audition, for example voices appear as older when preceded 
by the auditory presentation of much younger induction stimulus voices (Zäske and 
Schweinberger 2011), as angrier after adapting to a fearful voice (and vice versa) 
(Bestelmeyer et al. 2010), and as more masculine (or feminine) after adapting to a 
feminine (or masculine) voice (Bestelmeyer et al. 2010; Schweinberger et al. 2008; 
Zäske and Schweinberger 2011).
The effects also span the boundaries between some sensory modalities: from 
audition to vision for emotional expressions when subjects judge a face to be sad-
der after listening to laughter (Wang et al. 2016), and from touch to vision for facial 
expressions of sadness and happiness (Matsumiya 2013). They also occur from 
mental imagery to vision, in the case of face identity (Ryu et al. 2008) and of gen-
der7 (D’Ascenzo et al. 2014). Remarkably, in some cases after-effects occur between 
categories of visual stimuli, for example gender transfers between bodies and faces 
(Palumbo et al. 2015) and age transfers between hands and faces (Lai et al. 2012).
While the properties above are properties of faces or bodies, after-effects also 
appear in scene perception. Thus, scenes can appear more or less desert-like after 
the subject has seen a more or less “luscious” natural scene, or some scenes appear 
more or less natural after the subject has observed a natural or an urban landscape 
(Greene and Oliva 2008). In this paper I will focus on after-effects involving human 
faces and bodies, and their properties. However, I expect my discussion to general-
ize to other cases of after-effects.
3  After‑effects and the reach of perceptual content
One philosopher who appeals to after-effects in discussing the reach of percep-
tual experience is William Fish (2013). According to him, we can use perceptual 
after-effects to distinguish between properties which appear in the presentational 
(experiential) component of perception, and those that appear in the interpretative 
6 I use “appear” in a neutral way and not as a synonymous with “perceptual experience”. Finding out 
whether the experience is perceptual or post-perceptual is exactly what’s at stake in the debate. Similarly, 
I use “experience” from time to time to describe the displays, but once again I’m using it without ipso 
facto identifying it with “perceptual experience”.
7 In this experiment it is shown that adaptation in perception triggers a repulsive after-effect (after seeing 
a female face, the androgynous faces appears more male), while adaptation in visual imagery triggers an 
attractive after-effect (that is attractive toward the same gender of the adaptor—after seeing a female face 
the androgynous face appears as more female).
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(post-perceptual or cognitive) component. He cites research on after-effects for 
numerosity (Burr and Ross 2008) and writes: “Their [Burr and Ross’ 2008] rea-
soning behind this methodology was the observation that all agreed primary visual 
properties—the properties (such as size, orientation, shape, colour and motion) that 
everyone agrees appear in phenomenal character—are susceptible to after-effect. So, 
if we can show that another property is also susceptible to after-effects, we have an 
argument that this property appears in phenomenal character too.” (Fish 2013, p. 
52).8 His argument is an inference to the best explanation.
The evidence from after-effects has also been used by Block (2014) to show that 
we can perceive certain high-level properties (in particular facial properties). In the 
paper, he tries to rule out alternative explanations of the phenomenon in order to 
show that a perceptual representation of a high-level property is in fact the best pos-
sible explanation. In particular, Block focuses on: (1) ruling out alternative explana-
tions in terms of low-level properties,9 and (2) showing that after-effects with high-
level properties are sufficiently dissimilar from alternatives, such as post-perceptual 
and cognitive after-effects. It is useful to discuss his arguments against post-per-
ceptual options in more detail to elicit one background assumption in the appeal to 
after-effects: that low-level and high-level after-effects are sufficiently similar so we 
can project the characteristics of low-level after-effects onto high-level after-effects.
To rule out the possibility that the representation of the high-level property is not 
perceptual, Block gives several arguments against an appeal to cognitive factors in 
the explanation of the phenomenon, arguing for the conclusion that there are fea-
tures that distinguish perceptual effects from cognitive effects (Block 2014, p. 566). 
First, he tries to distinguish perceptual from cognitive effects by taking an indirect 
route through multistable perception. In the case of multistable perception (the spon-
taneous alternation between two or more perceptual states that occurs when sensory 
information is ambiguous) there are three properties of the experience that cognition 
and concepts do not have: these properties are exclusivity, inevitability, and random-
ness (Block 2014, p. 567). The presence of these properties (if one grants that they 
are absent from cognition) points toward the presence of a perceptual effect. Sec-
ond, perception is orientation-dependent, since it is easier and quicker to recognize 
objects in their canonical orientation (for example upright vs. inverted faces) rather 
than in a non-canonical orientation, and this independently from what the subjects 
think.10 The third argument is based on an experiment that compares hysteresis and 
10 I think that these two arguments are problematic, even if not for the same reasons why the third 
argument is. First of all, depending on the phenomenon at hand also cognition can exhibit features of 
exclusivity, inevitability, and randomness: intrusive thoughts are chief examples of this. If I’m alternat-
8 Briscoe (2015) challenges Fish’s appeal to after-effects, and suggests alternative explanations. I’ll 
come back to his objections in Sect. 6.
9 To rule out an appeal to clusters of low-level properties, Block offers two arguments. The first argu-
ment is an argument from simplicity of explanation: in order to explain away the phenomenon via con-
figurations of low-level properties, these configurations would have to be very complex, while a high-
level property would constitute a simpler explanation. Second, he appeals to an experimental result that 
compares different after-effect in upright and in inverted faces, and how these effects transfer from and 
to upright and inverted letter “Ts” (Susilo et al. 2010): low-level features transfer to Ts for inverted faces 
but not for upright faces, showing that in the upright case there is a face-specific effect not explained via 
adaptation to a low-level property.
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after-effect in the case of tilt, which shows that after-effects do not elicit activa-
tions in frontal and parietal areas, areas known for their involvement in cognitive 
thought (Schwiedrzik et al. 2012). Hysteresis and after-effects modulate perception 
in different ways: while hysteresis has an attractive effect where the subject has the 
impression that a stimulus tends in the same direction of motion (for example) as 
the stimulus presented just before, after-effects have a repulsive effect (as described 
in Sect.  2). An example of hysteresis is as follows: after briefly seeing a moving 
stimulus, another ambiguous stimulus appears to be moving in the same direction. It 
is often assumed that hysteresis and after-effects have different functions in relating 
previous experience with a currently perceived stimulus. The study used fMRI to 
show that hysteresis and after-effects for tilt map into two distinct anatomically and 
hierarchically segregated cortical networks, with after-effects being localized in a 
local node in early visual areas (V2/V3). Block uses this evidence to rule out a role 
of higher cognitive brain areas in after-effects.
A close look at Block’s arguments against cognitive interpretations of after-
effects reveals a background assumption in the after-effect arguments: that low-level 
after-effects and high-level after-effects are instances of the same phenomenon, and 
that features of low-level after-effects can be used to explore high-level after-effects. 
In the next section I discuss (and challenge) this assumption.
4  Are low‑level and high‑level after‑effects the same phenomenon?
Let’s take Block’s last argument from hysteresis and after-effect for tilt in favor of 
the perceptuality of after-effects. This experiment does not show that after-effects 
with a high-level property work just like after-effects with a low-level property, 
which is what is at stake. The only reliable conclusion from the experiment con-
cerns the function and localization of low-level after-effects (in this case for tilt). 
Why should high-level after-effects necessarily involve the very same functions, 
processes, (type of) localizations, and mechanisms as low-level after-effects? What 
guarantees that low-level after-effects and high-level after-effects are instances of 
the same psychological process? Assuming so much threatens to beg the question. 
ing between states of paranoia and states without paranoia, I can alternate between the thoughts “My 
neighbor is a Soviet spy” and “My neighbor is a nice person” randomly and without voluntarily con-
trol. Second, while it is true that inverted and upright faces are processed (and adapt) differently depend-
ing on the orientation of the stimulus, empirical data suggest that other cases of perceptual after-effect 
are orientation-independent. After-effect works even when the adaptor is a highly stylized cartoon face 
and the test a realistic face (Chen et  al. 2010), and, crucially, in cross-categorical cases between bod-
ies and faces, it works even if the orientation between the adaptor and the subsequently presented test 
changes  (Kessler et  al. 2013). In the latter experiment, the experimenters created a two-by-two design 
(inverted and upright bodies, inverted and upright faces) and found that all four conditions showed body-
face after-effect. They did not find an effect of body orientation nor an interaction between body and face 
orientation. According to the experimenters, this shows that bodies adapt and activate an orientation-
independent representation of faces. Therefore, the orientation-dependency criterion should be (at the 
very least) weakened.
Footnote 10 (continued)
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More evidence and arguments are needed to extend what is known in the case of 
low-level after-effects to high-level after-effects. While it is undeniable that high-
level and low-level after-effects share some characteristic features in common, it is 
also the case that they are less similar than it prima facie seems. I will first review 
the similarities between them, and then I will point to some of the differences.
Low-level and high-level cases of after-effects are of course similar with respect 
to their phenomenal profile: in both cases the subjects have an impression of a test 
stimulus that is pushed in the opposite direction from the adapted stimulus. Another 
shared property is their timescale. Facial identity, figural face after-effects (Rhodes 
et al. 2007) and facial expressions after-effects (Burton et al. 2016) follow the time-
course pattern of logarithmic build-up and exponential decay that has been found for 
many lower level after-effects (for tilt: Wolfe (1984)). Such timecourse patterns play 
an important role in cognitive scientific research on after-effects. Thus, Rhodes et al. 
(2007) rule out alternative explanations by varying the size of the face between the 
adapted and the test faces and observing the timecourse of the effect. According to 
them, “[t]he classic timecourse for identity and figural face after-effects also rein-
forces their perceptual nature and rules out demand characteristics and other post-
perceptual factors as plausible accounts.” (Rhodes et al. 2007, p. 2295).
On the other hand, there are several striking dissimilarities between low-level and 
high-level after-effects. I will focus on three such dissimilarities: the duration of the 
effect, the relation to awareness, and the role of categories on the effect. I will dis-
cuss each in turn.
The first difference is the duration of the effect. While high-level after-effects can 
be generated very quickly, by as little as 1 s of after-effect (Burton et al. 2016; Rho-
des et al. 2007); low-level after-effects, such as for tilt, by contrast, need more time 
to occur (Webster and MacLeod 2011).
High-level after-effects show a different susceptibility to awareness than low-
level ones. In particular, low-level after-effects seem to be immune to binocular 
rivalry11 suppression, while high-level after-effects are not immune and are vulner-
able to rivalry suppression (Blake and He 2005). More generally, while low-level 
after-effects can occur in the absence of awareness, many high-level after-effects are 
suppressed by a lack of awareness. For example, low-level properties (orientation, 
etc.) presented below the threshold of awareness can trigger the effect, whereas face 
identity-specific after-effects are cancelled when the adaptor is rendered invisible 
via rivalry or inattentional blindness (Moradi et al. 2005).
Finally, high-level after-effects exhibit cross-categoriality. Cross-categorical 
after-effects are not the same as cross-modal ones or cross-faculty ones: in cross-
modal after-effects, different sensory modalities are involved in the transfer of 
the same property, for example from audition to vision; cross-faculty effects, for 
11 In binocular rivalry two different images are presented to each eye. The subjects experience oscillat-
ing perceptions between the two images and not a combination of the two images. In some cases, how-
ever, the subjects experience a merger between the two images. Whether they experience a rivalry or a 
merger depends on the type of property perceived: rivalry occurs for local (monocular) properties, while 
merging occurs for global (binocular) properties (Block 2019).
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example, occur from visual imagery to vision. In cross-categorical cases, by con-
trast, effects span different categories: for example, there are after-effects between 
bodies and faces in the case of gender, in which subjects’ being exposed to faces 
presented frontally, and as a profile of a certain gender, had an impact on an androg-
ynous test body, which appeared more masculine after viewing female faces and 
vice versa (Palumbo et al. 2015). Another example occurs between hands and faces 
in the case of age: seeing a young or old face makes the test hands likely to be cat-
egorized as older or younger, respectively (Lai et al. 2012). I will come back to this 
feature of high-level effects in Sect. 6.
The first and second differences (in duration and susceptibility to awareness) have 
sometimes been used to suggest that after-effects might belong to a set of computa-
tions that range across different levels of brain activity, and it has been argued that 
as a result adaptation cannot be identified with a specific level of visual processing 
(Webster 2012). But these differences could also be taken to suggest that the current 
concept of after-effects is too coarse-grained. Future research might end up splitting 
it into different phenomena, with different features, and different mechanisms, if/
when these are discovered. The main point here is that, in applying the after-effect 
criterion, we also need to supplement the inference to the best explanation with evi-
dence showing that low-level and high-level effects are truly instances of the same 
phenomenon.
Moreover, the discussion of the differences between low-level and high-level 
after-effects introduces the possibility, explored in the next section, that high-level 
after-effects are better accounted for as spanning both perceptual and post-percep-
tual, cognitive, phenomena.
5  Are there cognitive after‑effects?
The challenge from putative cognitive after-effects connects the application of the 
after-effect criterion with the issue of how to draw the border between perception 
and cognition: the defender of the criterion needs to show that both types of after-
effects are perceptual. Indeed, the differences between high-level and low-level cases 
are sufficient to justify that a competing explanation should be taken seriously, viz. 
that some cases of high-level after-effect are cognitive (Helton 2016; Storrs 2015). 
The reasoning behind this alternative explanation—which I will refer to as the “cog-
nitive alternative”—is that if there are examples of cognitive after-effects, then the 
after-effect criterion couldn’t be used for exploring the contents of perception.
The cognitive alternative appeals to the existence of phenomena in cognition that 
seem very similar to known cases of perceptual after-effects. Helton’s original exam-
ple of a putative cognitive after-effect uses house size as the relevant property (Hel-
ton 2016): we browse through a real estate listing that contains only huge houses and 
we adapt to that size. Afterwards we read the description of an average-sized house 
and we immediately judge without reflection: “this house is small!”.
One problem with this example, in my view, is that it could be explained via 
after-effects mediated by visual imagery: the automatic judgement about house sizes 
might reflect after-effects from visual imagery to visual imagery. When reading a list 
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of houses’ sizes, we might spontaneously imagine their size in our visual imagery 
(for example, imagining a mansion for a big house, and a 1-bedroom flat for a small 
house). An alternative case that avoids confounds from mental imagery is the fol-
lowing: You are planning to buy a house in Great Britain and your real estate agent 
gives you the listing below, which contains the most expensive streets in the country 
(Fig. 2).
After adapting to this list, you see a house marketed at the average price in Great 
Britain, which is £ 226,234, and you immediately think: “This house is cheap!”.
There is surely some broad analogy between such cases and perceptual after-
effects. But how similar are such putative cognitive after-effects to perceptual after-
effects? While I think that the cognitive alternative provides an important challenge 
to the after-effect criterion, I am not in favor of endorsing it. The reason is that puta-
tive cognitive after-effects are, upon closer examination, sufficiently dissimilar from 
known perceptual after-effects (of either type).
The first dissimilarity comes from the application of a “test”: can the effect be 
de-biased by a top-down strategy? If only the putative cognitive after-effects can 
be de-biased, but not the known cases of (perceptual) after-effects, this points to a 
difference deep enough to help us distinguish between genuine cases of after-effects 
and cases that are only superficially similar.
To explore how de-biasing could work, I appeal to research on “anchoring bias” 
as an illustration (Furnham and Boo 2011).12 Anchoring indicates the tendency in 
Fig. 2  Snapshot from the guardian
12 Interestingly, the ‘house’ example could also be explained by an appeal to the ‘contrast effect’ in deci-
sion making (Bhargava and Fisman 2014). This further supports the point that putative cognitive after-
effects are sufficiently dissimilar from known cases of after-effects in perception.
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human cognition to rely too much on the first piece of information that has been 
registered in order to decide or formulate a judgement. A classic example of an 
anchoring effect is as follows: in a negotiation about the price of a car, the initial 
price offered sets the subsequent standard for the rest of the negotiation. As a result, 
offered prices that are lower than the initial price seem acceptable, even if they are 
actually too high compared to what the product is actually worth.
What is crucial for our purposes is that the anchoring effect can be de-biased via 
several top-down strategies (even if, unfortunately, they are more effective in the 
lab than in real life). One such strategy is “consider-the-opposite” strategy,13 where 
the judger has to consider anchor-inconsistent data and arguments in order to access 
anchor-inconsistent knowledge to mitigate the bias in the final decision (Muss-
weiler et al. 2000). Another strategy is to consider the opponent’s best alternative 
in a negotiation by trying to take the other’s perspective (Galinsky and Mussweiler 
2001). Yet another strategy is to give participants an anchor in a different seman-
tic category than the target estimate value (for example the value of the height of 
the Brandenburg Gate does not anchor the judgement about the width of the Gate) 
(Strack and Mussweiler 1997). Even merely having an anchoring alert message on 
a computer screen while doing estimates is effective in reducing the bias (George 
et al. 2000). All these top-down strategies help the judger to stop relying on the first 
value offered, with a success that depends on the degree of awareness of the bias on 
the subject’s part.
Can we apply some of these de-biasing strategies to the house price case? It 
seems that we can. To avoid anchoring our judgements to the price of London’s most 
expensive streets we can consider the difference between the price seen and the aver-
age house price in Great Britain, or we can try to think of a number value in another 
domain (e.g. the number of windows in a house), or wonder about the intentions of 
our real estate agent by taking his perspective. Or we can simply become strongly 
aware of the influence of the list on our final judgement. While these examples are 
not experimentally tested, they offer a very plausible case for the claim that putative 
cognitive after-effects are contingent on voluntary top-down decisions.
Known after-effects (including those involving high-level properties), on the 
other hand, appear to be resistant to revision in light of evidence and voluntary, top-
down efforts. Indeed, no de-biasing strategies seem available for perceptual after-
effects: being aware of the effect does not make the after-effects go away. Once after-
effects have started their course they will persist, up to a week later in the case of 
some high-level after-effects. This might point towards a “deeper” characteristic of 
perception—its encapsulation (Firestone and Scholl 2016; Fodor 1983). Encapsula-
tion is a property of modular processes that only use information within the system 
to perform computations on a domain-specific set of stimuli. The early stages of 
perception are examples of strongly encapsulated processes, but there are (arguably) 
many other processes that are modular and encapsulated. Perceptual after-effects 
are not encapsulated in the strongest possible sense, as the data on cross-modal 
13 This only works if the judger does not fall prey of the confirmation bias in searching for anchor-incon-
sistent arguments and evidence.
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after-effects from mental imagery to vision suggest, but they are nevertheless encap-
sulated from decision making processes in central cognition, since they are resistant 
to revision via top-down strategies. This makes them very different from putative 
cognitive after-effects, from the perspective of cognitive architecture.
There are other differences between the after-effects discussed in the previous 
sections and the putative cognitive after-effects. First, putative cognitive after-effects 
do not seem to show the timecourse of both low-level and high-level perceptual 
after-effects, viz. logarithmic build-up and exponential decay. Second, while percep-
tual after-effects usually show a ‘repulsion’ effect,14 putative cognitive after-effects 
can manifest both a repulsion and an attraction effect, depending on the context. 
Once again, the anchoring bias can be used as a guide: in the bias the first value 
offered sets the standard for subsequent judgements which are all compared to this 
first value. Presenting someone with huge houses as the first value sets her stand-
ards higher than usual, and medium-sized houses that she would have accepted in 
another context now seem smaller than what appears acceptable to her. While this 
looks like a repulsion effect (away from judging medium houses as average), with 
a relevantly different task one instead observes an attraction of the first value. For 
example, in Tversky and Kahneman (1975) subjects are asked to guess a certain 
number (the percentage of countries in the United Nations that are African coun-
tries) and are anchored with either a low or a high number (via a roulette that stops 
at either 10 or 65). Their guess is in the vicinity of the anchored number (25% and 
45% respectively). In this case subjects were not asked to judge a given number, but 
to spontaneously produce a number themselves. It seems plausible that for the puta-
tive cognitive after-effect (whether the size or the price of a house) in a spontane-
ous judgement context, subjects would produce a number that is closer (rather than 
farther) to the anchored value when asked to give a number themselves. In the case 
of the house price, if asked to provide the average price for a house in the U.K. peo-
ple would produce a number closer to the anchored one. Therefore, whether puta-
tive cognitive after-effects exhibit repulsion or attraction depends on the context and 
question asked.
This brings me to my main methodological and conceptual point: the house size 
and price examples in fact bear only a vague similarity to core cases of after-effect. 
Is this similarity really sufficient to support the claim that the house examples and 
known after-effects to e.g. emotional expressions, are manifestations of the same 
phenomenon, in any scientifically relevant sense? In my view, while appeals to high-
level after-effect for extending the reach of perception may have been too narrowly 
modelled on known cases of low-level after-effects, putative cognitive after-effects 
are, by contrast, too loosely modelled on known cases of high-level after-effects.
I’m not denying that for some purposes superficial similarity might be enough. 
Perhaps for some purposes we might want to group together putative cognitive 
after-effects with perceptual after-effects. But de-biasing and other properties show 
that there are deep differences between the perceptual and the cognitive cases, 
14 With few exceptions: in low-level cases, after-effects become “attractive” at small inducing angles, see 
Westheimer (2011).
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differences that can have an impact on how the subject behaves. De-biasing is not a 
property that is part of our current understanding of after-effects, but it is a property 
that can help us draw a possible line between perception and cognition, and which 
is important to our overall understanding of cognitive architecture. To overcome a 
bias, the subject can apply strategies and replace an initially formulated judgement 
with a more reflective judgement; in the case of a perceptual illusion (such as the 
Ebbinghaus illusion or the Müller-Lyer illusion), the subject cannot overcome the 
judgement formulated on the basis of the illusion, even when she knows that her 
perception is not veridical. If after-effects are compelling in the same way percep-
tual illusions are, this might not be merely accidental but an important part of their 
nature.
This sounds like good news for the proponent of the after-effect criterion. I’ve just 
argued that there are important differences between putative cognitive after-effects 
and perceptual after-effects, with de-biasing playing a crucial role. A defender of 
the after-effect argument for extending the reach of perception could then modify 
the criterion as follows: a high-level property can be experienced in perception if 
(a) it is susceptible to after-effects; and (b) the effect cannot be de-biased. Such a 
modified criterion doesn’t rely on the same phenomenon assumption, criticized in 
Sect. 4. After-effects might be of different types, but still relevant to the question of 
the reach of perception. In the next section I will discuss a challenge that even this 
improved version of the after-effect criterion still faces.
6  High‑level after‑effects without the high‑level property?
The third challenge is that high-level after-effects could be perceptual, but not 
involve the representation of a high-level property. There are at least two versions of 
the challenge.
According to the first version, the effect could involve low-level properties only, 
without involving the target high-level property. This alternative explanation was 
evoked by Briscoe (2015) in response to Fish. Drawing on Durgin (2008), Briscoe 
suggests that it is not numerosity per se that supports the effect, but the relative dis-
tance of the dots;15 likewise, in cases involving emotion or gender, it is not emo-
tion or gender per se that provoke the effect, but certain dispositions of facial traits 
that correlate with these high-level properties. He writes that “[a]n empirically 
well-motivated, alternative explanation is that the numerosity judgments made in 
Burr and Ross’s experiment are based on perceived, relative texture density rather 
than perceived, relative numerosity” (Briscoe 2015, p. 185). This supports the idea 
that high-level adaptation effects might be “inherited” from low-level processing 
15 There is, however, an objection to Briscoe’s alternative explanation, suggested by Sam Clarke: in the 
case of analogue magnitude representations it has been shown that simple sensory properties cannot 
account for cross-modal transfer effects (Meck and Russell 1983). Similarly, for numerosity, the explana-
tion of the effect might not be due to low-level features, but to a high-level, non-perceptual, representa-
tion.
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and spread towards higher levels of processing, and are therefore not due to high-
level properties per se being genuinely perceived [see also Dickinson and Badcock 
(2013)].
Contra Briscoe it is not clear that all cases of perceptual after-effects can be 
explained via low-level features or their attentional grouping. The transfer can also 
occur between an adaptor and a test stimulus that do not share any low-level fea-
tures. I have reviewed in Sect. 2 data showing the existence of cross-modal after-
effects from audition to vision or from touch to vision, and data on cross-modal 
after-effects. This puts pressure on the objection from low-level properties.16
Briscoe is aware of this problem and proposes that other high-level after-effects 
could be due to post-perceptual processes (an option similar to the one explored in 
the previous section on putative cognitive after-effects). He discusses the existence 
of cross-category after-effects in an experiment that shows the existence of after-
effects from gendered objects (such as high heels or lipstick for “female” objects 
and razors and motorcycles for “male” objects) to the gender of the face, perceived 
as being more masculine after the subjects were adapted to a “female” object, and 
as more feminine after the subjects were adapted to a masculine object (Javadi and 
Wee 2012).
Nevertheless, data on cross-modal effects of the kind Briscoe mentions is cur-
rently limited. There is only one other experiment, to my knowledge, showing a 
similar effect using gendered objects and names that influence gender perception 
(Utz and Carbon 2015). There are no known studies that show after-effects from 
emotionally charged objects onto facial expressions. For example, within the same 
valence category subjects projected either sadness, disgust, anger or fear into the 
same face when sad, disgusting, angering or fearful objects were present (Aviezer 
et al. 2008). Yet, in the case of emotional expressions, adaptation to facial expres-
sions does not occur after seeing non-facial images expressing emotions (such as a 
dog being afraid) or reading words that convey emotions (such as AFRAID) (Fox 
and Barton 2007).
This brings me to the reformulation of the challenge. According to the second 
version of the challenge, some high-level after-effects could be instances of a change 
in a decision about category boundaries that might not be due to the representation 
of a high-level property, but to a shift in the decision criterion. I call this option “the 
decisional bias option”. The decisional bias could be based on low-level proper-
ties, and not on a representation of the high-level properties. This possibility brings 
together the challenge from low-level properties and apparent post-perceptual after-
effects in a unique alternative explanation.
Let me develop the challenge in more detail. In the experimental displays, when 
testing high-level after-effects, subjects have to give a judgement on category 
16 An anonymous reviewer suggests a way of saving the low-level explanation via visual imagery. When 
the subject hears a happy voice, she imagines a happy face. The happy face and the visually presented 
stimulus do share low-level features, and the stimulus the subject adapted to is the visually imagined face 
rather than the voice itself. I don’t have a strong argument against this possibility: it might be empirically 
tested by looking at subjects with aphantasia (an impossibility to engage in visual imagery) to uncover 
whether they still experience the effect.
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membership: either in a forced-2-choice task where they have to decide which cat-
egory the stimulus belongs to, or via a rating within a certain category, e.g.: Is the 
face male or female? (forced-2-choice task); How “feminine” does the test face look 
(rating within a certain category)?
This raises a methodological worry for the experimental design used in testing 
high-level after-effects, which has been pointed out by Storrs (2015). According to 
Storrs, current methodologies cannot discriminate between explanations of high-
level after-effects in terms of perceptual bias or in terms of post-perceptual bias. 
Storrs’ main worry is that when the subject assesses to which category a stimulus 
belongs, her response depends on both her perceptual experience and on her deci-
sional criterion for applying the category to what she sees. This issue is controlled 
for in the low-level cases by testing the effect through a comparison between a stim-
ulus in the adapted area (situated within a few degrees of the adaptor, since the low-
level after-effect is local) and a stimulus in the non-adapted area. This allows for 
comparisons between test and reference stimuli that do not impinge on a decisional 
bias—for example, via a matching task consisting in adjusting the test stimulus in 
the adapted location until it matches the reference stimulus in the non-adapted loca-
tion. Such a test is not currently available for high-level after-effects since they seem 
to be spatially global rather than local (Storrs 2015), which makes the comparison 
between an adapted and an un-adapted area (at least for the time being) an impracti-
cable methodology for high-level properties.17
Storrs’ methodological worry bears on the debate on how to extend the reach of 
perceptual content, because it undermines the after-effect criterion. According to the 
criterion, the best explanation of the effect is that the subject has an experience with 
the high-level property. But the methodological worry suggests that the response 
pattern in high-level after-effects is compatible with subjects’ decisional shift with-
out the high-level property necessarily appearing in the content of perception. Of 
course, the methodological worry is compatible with the high-level property in fact 
being represented, but the point here is that the defender of the criterion can’t apply 
it without also having another method to show that the high-level property is experi-
enced by the subject.
There are two experiments that suggest that category membership plays a role in 
eliciting after-effects (and not necessarily the representation of the high-level prop-
erty). First, Bestelmeyer et al. (2008) tested the influence of category on high-level 
after-effects by exploring two sets of faces: (1) the first set contained faces from 
17 Storrs mentions other worries as well. Her first worry is that for low-level cases there are studies on 
the properties of early visual neurons that support perceptual bias, but the properties of neurons in the 
high-level visual areas that mediate the effect are unknown. To this one could reply that in due course we 
might discover properties of neurons and channels in high-level perception. Another worry concerns the 
reduction of sensitivity in the detection of adapted properties and its increase in discrimination sensitiv-
ity. This change in sensitivity is commonly taken to show a perceptual bias (Kohn 2007; Storrs 2015). In 
the high-level case on the other hand, studies are more mixed: while most studies did not find a change 
in sensitivity for face after-effect, a few have found improved discrimination for face after-effect for some 
properties. For example adapting to trustworthy faces improves the discrimination threshold for facial 
trustworthiness (Keefe et al. 2013).
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male and female categories; (2) the second set contained faces within the same cat-
egory (female and hyper-female). Structural differences were kept mathematically 
identical between the male and female faces on the one hand, and the female and 
hyper-female faces on the other hand. The opposite after-effect was present in the 
between categories case (after adaptation to a female face, the test face looked more 
masculine, and vice versa). However, the opposite after-effect was not found in the 
within category case (between female and hyper-female faces). This suggests that at 
least in the case of gender, after-effects transfer between categories but not within 
categories. It is an open question whether this generalizes to other high-level proper-
ties as well.
Second, in the case of emotional expressions the effect is stronger when stim-
uli belong to categories distant in valence (positive and negative emotions), while 
within one valence category the effects are mixed: in investigating anger, fear, and 
disgust, it was found that after-effect to disgust biases perception away from dis-
gust, after-effect to fear biases toward disgust, after-effect to anger and disgust biases 
away from anger, while after-effect to anger has no effect on disgust or fear (Pell and 
Richards 2011).
An effect on category boundaries rather than on the experience of the property 
per se could also explain cross-categorical cases of after-effect from bodies to faces, 
and from body parts to faces, and the (rare) cases of after-effects from ‘gendered’ 
objects to faces. These cases are incompatible with Fish’s proposal (that there is 
a distinctive look in the case of high-level properties) and with the proposal that 
reduces effects to the perception of low-level properties, because there are no low-
level properties in common between faces and bodies. Seeing a feminine body could 
push the categorization criterion for the perceived face in the opposite direction 
when a stimulus situated at the boundary is presented.
A defender of the cognitive option could argue that the decisional shift option 
actually sides with the post-perceptual/cognitive alternative, similar to the one dis-
cussed in Sect. 5. Indeed, Storrs herself talks about a “post-perceptual” bias.
There is another possibility: the decisional bias playing a role in high-level after-
effects could still occur within the perceptual module. The decision bias might be 
“modularized” in a downward manner (Pylyshyn 1999). Downward modulariza-
tion occurs when a process becomes automatic. Automaticity comes with a setback, 
which is lack of flexibility, exemplified by the inability of the system to use infor-
mation outside the module: the module is sensitive only to the inputs in a specific 
domain and to the processes that connect the inputs with the outputs. One example 
of downward modularization is automatic mindreading, where an effortful ability 
becomes effortless, after repeated practice, at the expense of flexibility (Apperly 
2010). Another example is categorical perception of colors, where being exposed to 
new color terms for a certain amount of time creates a shift in existing color bounda-
ries (e.g. by introducing a new boundary between blue and light blue, after learning 
the Russian words ‘sinyi’ and ‘golybou’) (Jraissati 2012). I’m not claiming here that 
high-level after-effects work precisely like mindreading or categorical perception 
of colors. Instead I’m providing two rather uncontroversial examples of modular-
ized processes that are not the paradigmatic early visual module, and that involve a 
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decisional process (such as linking a visual action to the mental state usually causing 
it) that occurs within the module.
Yet, this is not good news for the proponent of the after-effect criterion: if high-
level after-effects are based on the representation of low-level properties and on a 
modularized decisional shift within the module, then there is nothing we can con-
clude about the representation of the high-level property. This only suggests that 
the decisional shift involved in category assignment is not necessarily based on a 
voluntarily resolution on the part of the subject; it might be a process that occurs 
within the perceptual module, as the resistance to top-down influence shows. But 
if there is a decisional bias within the module, and this accounts for (at least) some 
of the effects, then the after-effect criterion cannot be used to show that a high-level 
property is represented in perception, unless it is also shown that the decision on 
category assignment is based on the representation of the high-level property.
To sum up, the third challenge to the after-effect criterion is that high-level 
effects might not be due to the representation of the target high-level property, either 
because they are based on the representation of a set of low-level properties, or 
because they are based on the representation of low-level properties plus a modular-
ized decisional bias on category assignment.
7  Conclusion
In this paper I have criticized the use of after-effects in exploring the reach of per-
ceptual content. In the current literature, one finds two opposite positions on the 
theoretical import of perceptual after-effects. The first position is that after-effects 
can be used to as a criterion of perception (Fish 2013; Block 2014). The second 
position is that after-effects are a more general and widespread phenomenon that 
encompasses both perception and cognition, and therefore cannot be used as a crite-
rion of perception (Storrs 2015; Helton 2016).
I criticized both of these options with the aim of outlining the conditions that 
would allow us to use the after-effect criterion for the exploration of the reach of 
perception. First, the existence of differences between low-level cases and high-level 
cases prevents us from simply projecting what we know about low-level cases to 
high-level cases. Second, the critical discussion of the cognitive alternative brought 
forward a supplementary condition for the application of the criterion: the “no-debi-
asing condition”, which wasn’t part of the original formulation of the criterion. This 
is good news for the partisan of the criterion, but it’s still not enough: we also need 
to rule out an alternative in terms of low-level properties plus a decisional shift. To 
rule out this alternative, the partisan of the criterion needs to show that the deci-
sional shift about category boundaries is based on the representation of the high-
level property.
In conclusion, I hope that the discussion in this paper will help the proponents 
of the criterion in refining their proposal. In particular, they would need to show 
that low-level and high-level after-effects are sufficiently similar, that the effect is 
truly non-debiasable, and that the effect is not due to a decisional shift on category 
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membership based on low-level properties, but on the representation of the target 
high-level property.
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